Arrow's impossibility result not only had a profound influence on welfare economics but was, as this paper shows, also widely discussed in philosophy of science and in the engineering design literature.
Introduction
Kenneth Arrow's impossibility result had an enormous impact on welfare economics and finally led to a new area called "social choice theory" and the launching of a new scientific journal with the title Social Choice and Welfare.
Arrow's seminal work on the (non-)existence of a social welfare function also had a profound influence on philosophical writings about justice and equity.
The list of these contributions is long. Only a few should be mentioned here. further, all the more so because that path has been well explored during the last three or four decades.
What I wish to do in what follows is, first, to take a closer look at another area within philosophy, namely a discussion that had its beginning in Thomas Kuhn's famous statement that there is no neutral algorithm for theory choice and, second -at first sight rather surprising, for me at least -a discussion of the relevance of Arrow's theorem in engineering, where the issue is how to make 3 rational choices among alternative design options. This short summary already indicates the structure of sections 2 and 3 of this paper. A few concluding remarks are gathered in section 4.
Kuhn's no neutral algorithm thesis
In order to evaluate and compare alternative theories adequately, particularly in the natural sciences, Thomas Kuhn (1962 Kuhn ( , 1974 Kuhn ( , 1977 argued that theory choice should be based on at least five epistemic criteria or values, namely accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. "Together with others of much the same sort, they provide the shared basis for theory choice" (Kuhn 1977 , p. 357). However, different scientists can create more than one ranking of rival theories even if they agree that the evaluation should be done solely in relation to Kuhn's (1977, p. 358 ) criteria: "When scientists must choose between competing theories, two men fully committed to the same list of criteria for choice may nevertheless reach different conclusions. Perhaps they interpret simplicity differently or have different convictions about the range of fields within which the consistency criterion must be met. Or perhaps they agree about these matters but differ about the relative weights to be accorded to these or to other criteria when several are deployed together."
Kuhn argues that philosophers of science often have neglected the subjective elements that enter into theory choice. Algorithmic decision procedures that 4 attempt to solve the theory choice problem often presuppose "that individual criteria of choice can be unambiguously stated and also that, if more than one proves relevant, an appropriate weight function is at hand for their joint application" (Kuhn 1977 It is interesting to note that Okasha finally follows Sen's (1977) proposal to enrich the informational basis of the aggregation procedure. Just to remind the reader, Sen suggested that the underlying utility information be broadened or enhanced. Then interpersonal comparisons of, for example, utility levels are made possible so that Rawls's (1971) difference principle, which looks at individual positions under alternative social states, can reasonably be applied.
One example that Okasha discusses at greater length in this context is the Bayesian approach to scientific inference.
Consider several rival hypotheses Ti, i ∊ {1,…, m}, and a body of evidence E. The Bayesian approach assigns two scores to each theory Ti. The first is the prior probability P(Ti), and the second is the conditional likelihood P(E|Ti). Various ways of combining these two criteria into a decision rule are possible.
Bayesians argue that one should multiply the prior by the conditional 7 likelihood, namely to consider the quantity P(Ti) ⨯ P(E|Ti). Both P(Ti) and P(E|Ti) imply a ranking of theories and thus constitute a "preference" profile. The problem of deriving an overall ranking of theories as a function of these two orderings is an example of the aggregation problem. Okasha speaks in this context of a Bayesian theory choice "functional" and refers to Sen's (1970 Sen's ( , 1977 As already indicated, the discussion in philosophy of science after Okasha's article is very reminiscent of the debate in social choice theory after Arrow had published his path-breaking monograph on collective choice in 1951. As we will see shortly, it is very similar to a discussion of optimal design decisions in the engineering profession.
Coming back very briefly to theory choice, Michael Morreau (2014 Morreau ( , 2015 thinks that the assumption of unrestricted domain is inappropriate in relation to theory choice. He argues that the variety in the criterial orderings does not appear to be rich enough in order to warrant this requirement; he gives several examples from "toy science" and real science. Marcel Weber (2011), in contrast to Okasha, believes that the non-dictatorship condition should be abandoned in the case of theory choice. Fruitfulness in particular should be considered as a 9 dictatorial criterion among the epistemic values. Finally, Davide Rizza (2014, p. 1852)) thinks that Arrow's impossibility result has no relevance for theory choice as soon as one exploits the "sequencing or betweenness information" that is contained in an ordinal profile. Here, Rizza refers to Don Saari (1995) who, in various publications, has been arguing for positional methods, the Borda rank-order scheme in particular. Arguments in favor of this aggregation procedure which takes "ordinal distances" into account will reappear in the next section.
From collective choice to engineering design
There are two situations in engineering design for which the Arrow theorem may or, perhaps may not, apply. The first one sees a single engineer who has to evaluate alternative designs (a new body for a particular type of car, for example) according to a finite number of criteria. At the end of the day, this engineer is expected to come up with a rational decision that systematically orders the alternative conceivable designs. This is a multi-criteria decision problem. The second situation depicts a group of several engineers, "having different responsibilities for different features of the design -e.g., structural integrity energy efficiency, control system robustness, safety, effectiveness of Indeed, nearly all engineering requirements are of one of three forms: less is better, more is better, or closer to a particular target is better" (Scott and Antonsson 1999, p. 224). This may be true in a variety of cases, but what happens when some criteria follow the dictum of "smaller better than larger", while others follow the maxim that "larger is to be preferred to smaller"? Table   1 depicts such a case (Gaertner 2016 ). Four alternatives characterized by their (increasing) power are available. The criteria are weight, power to weight and cost. While criteria 1 and 3 follow the former "philosophy", criterion 2 follows the latter. According to criterion 1, we obtain that a is better than b, which is better than c, which again is better than d. Criterion 2 prefers c to b, b to d, and d to a; and criterion 3 finds d best, then a, which is followed by b, with c being last. These rankings, taken separately, are very intuitive. Taken together, they 12 cannot be arranged in a single-peaked fashion. Actually, two of the triplecombinations display a latin-square structure, namely (a, b, d) and (a, c, d ). This shows that Scott and Antonsson's argumentation may not lead too far as a general way out of the Arrovian dilemma.
Table 1 about here
The authors assert that a practical difference exists between social choice and engineering design. Designs may have to fulfil constraints. "A maximum stress indicates the point at which a design breaks and fails; government regulations must be fulfilled or a design is not allowed on the market" (Scott and or data points. In addition, these rankings often produce good designs." So again, we find a similarity in reasoning between theory choice and decisions in engineering design, two fields that do not seem to know one another, as one does not find any quotations from the other literature in either area. 14 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have tried to show that Kenneth Arrow's impossibility result, which shook up major parts of welfare economics, also had a larger impact on fields of science that are quite far away from economics proper. At first sight, one would not have expected that Arrow's negative result would ever be discussed seriously in the philosophy of science and in engineering. It is also interesting to witness stunning parallels in the argumentation that emerged outside economics. In both fields that we were looking at, one can find arguments to give up the unrestricted domain condition, in both areas one also encounters arguments in favor of violating the independence condition and for considering a Borda-type aggregation procedure. The three criteria "weight", "power/weight" and "cost", taken together, cannot be arranged in a single-peaked fashion.
